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Abstract 
We examine the failure determinants for large quoted UK industrials using a 
panel data set comprising 539 firms observed over the period 1988-93. The 
empirical design employs data from company accounts and is based on 
Chamberlain’s conditional binomial logit model, which allows for unobservable, 
firm-specific, time-invariant factors associated with failure risk. We find a 
noticeable degree of heterogeneity across the sample companies. Our panel 
results show that, after controlling for unobservables, lower liquidity measured 
by the quick assets ratio, slower turnover proxied by the ratio of debtors 
turnover, and profitability were linked to the higher risk of insolvency in the 
analysis period. The findings appear to support the proposition that the current 
cash-flow considerations, rather than the future prospects of the firm, 
determined company failures over the 1990s recession.    
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1. Introduction  
 
The innovation in this paper follows from the use of both time-series 
and cross-section data to model the empirical determinants of 
company failure on large quoted industrial UK firms observed over 
the period 1988-93. Numerous studies, employing cross-sectional 
data and independent variables derived from accounts, have 
provided models that have proved useful for the identification of 
poorly performing companies with financial profiles similar to those 
of firms placed into regimes of legal insolvency. Taffler and Tisshaw 
(1977), Marais (1979), Taffler (1982), Goudie (1987), Goudie and 
Meeks (1991), Cosh and Hughes (1995) have modelled financial 
failure as a classification problem, where the binary response 
variable falls into one of two classes: failed firms and non-failed 
firms, and the risk of failure is then quantified using discriminant 
analysis combined with cross-sectional data and covariates purely 
based on accounting measures. An alternative approach based on 
logit, which has been used to model the causal relationship from 
firm’s attributes to the probability of failure was utilised by Peel, 
Peel, and Pope (1986), Keasey and McGuinness (1990), and Morris 
(1997). Recent UK work by Alici (1995), Tyree and Long (1995), 
and Wilson, Chong, and Peel (1995) has employed a newer, but 
statistically less well defined analytical approach of neural networks 
to classify the data.1  
 
The objective of the present study is to extend existing work by using 
a panel of UK quoted companies that spans 1988-93 and reflects 
changes in financial performance over a recession period.2 This 
extension to panel data is based on Chamberlain’s (1980) 
conditional logit model with a binomial response. Aside from 
providing larger numbers of observations, which allows one to 
alleviate the cross-sectional problem of over-sampling the failed 
category relative to the proportion of failed companies in the 
population, a panel data set enables one to carry out more 
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sophisticated statistical analysis and to increase the likelihood that 
valid conclusions regarding found associations between the failure 
outcome and firm’s attributes, are drawn. For instance, we may wish 
to take account of unobserved heterogeneity across firms by applying 
fixed and random effects models. While cross-section estimates of 
company failure determinants are likely to suffer from the problem 
of omitted variable bias, the use of panel data is one solution to the 
problem of controlling for underlying additive individual effects. 
Many company characteristics might tend not to vary over time, 
especially over short periods. In addition to that, certain firm-specific 
attributes are simply undetectable in a cross-sectional data set but 
nonetheless are likely to influence company performance and 
therefore to be correlated with observable financial ratios. Company 
failure is a multi-dimensional process. It is likely that the following 
unobserved individual effects are linked to the probability of failure: 
the firm’s sales exposure to export,3 organisation and ownership 
structure,4 technological and managerial qualities, “know-how” 
stock, industry-specific influences,5 aspects of the business location, 
industrial union power,6 as well as vulnerability to external shocks 
explained by a particular type of debt finance that can be issued, for 
instance, either at fixed rate or at variable-rate.7 The existence of 
firm-specific effects seems to be consistent with the view that 
selection effects of recessions are unevenly spread amongst firms (see 
e.g. Geroski and Gregg, 1996; Morris, 1997). In other words, a panel 
data set may be more robust to incomplete model specifications. 
Finally, in the panel of UK quoted firms, the data on failing firms are 
synchronised with the data on companies that survived the economic 
downturn of 1990-92.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
panel dataset. Section 3 turns to the explanatory variables in our 
model. Section 4 deals with issues of model specification and 
estimation and section 5 presents the main results.  
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2. The Sample 
 
We define company failure as the event of entering a legal 
insolvency regime (administrative receivership, or administration, or 
winding-up, i.e. liquidation). That allows us to employ in model 
development a binary response describing the failure outcome, 
which takes the value 1 in the year the failing company published 
the last set of accounts and 0 otherwise. The data for the present 
panel study of company failure consist of company accounts’ items 
and market valuation information for the six-year period 1988-93 
and were extracted from the DATASTREAM database in 1997. The 
data set is a moderately sized unbalanced panel, constituting 539 
individual quoted industrial companies, 56 of which discontinued 
publishing financial records over these six years due to entering a 
legal insolvency regime. Such short and wide panel appears common 
of data employed in microeconomic studies (see e.g. Greene, 1997), 
where a relatively large number of individual units is observed over 
the quite small number of periods. Our panel is unbalanced as we 
equate the date of failure with the fiscal year, in which, according to 
the DATASTREAM records, the failing company issues the last set 
of accounts. Therefore, this calendar year is considered as the firm’s 
last year in the panel. In our sample, a failed company terminates 
reports from twelve to twenty months before insolvency proceedings 
commence, while a choice of the particular sample period of 1988-
93, is a reflection of those lead times. The years of sample data were 
arrived at via identification the dates of release of the last accounts 
of: (i) firms, where formal insolvency was concurrent with the 1990-
92 recession, and (ii) companies, where failures might have resulted 
from operations during the recession, even though the recession 
phase had actually ended before the date of insolvency.  
 
Transition of companies within the unbalanced panel can be seen in 
Table 1. Since failing companies exit the panel, the sub-panel of 
failed firms is unbalanced. In contrast to the failed company 
category, 483 non-failing firms are being followed over the whole 
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six-year period of the panel, meaning that the resulting sub-panel of 
non-failed firms is complete and rectangular. Names of 56 quoted 
industrial companies that entered insolvency state in the early 1990s, 
have been identified by using various editions of the London Stock 
Exchange Official Yearbook. Non-failed company names were taken 
from the DATASTREAM “live” list of quoted industrials as of 13 
February 1997.8 We intend to base the panel analysis upon the fixed 
effects estimator, from which inference is drawn with respect to the 
effects that lie within the sample. Therefore it was essential to 
include in the data set all quoted industrials with consistently 
available records for the period. We selected 483 non-failed firms 
with continuous records over the late 1980s and through to mid 
1990s. The non-failed category is deliberately “over-sampled” to 
resemble the actual incidence of insolvencies in the population. 
Annual rates of failures in the constructed panel vary from 1.01 to 
3.34 per cent (Table 1). In terms of company mix, the population of 
firms selected is restricted by the exclusion of companies from the 
petroleum, transportation, and financial services sectors. Table 2 
shows that more than 80 per cent of non-failed and failed firms come 
from manufacturing and services sectors.   
 
3. Explanatory Variables 
 
The appropriateness of detecting the important determinants of 
failure within the framework of traditional binary response statistical 
models combined with explanatory variables derived from 
accounting data, is evidential from the apparent ex ante predictive 
ability of such proprietary applications for assessing quoted 
industrial companies as the UK-based Z-score model (Taffler, 1995) 
and the US-based ZETAÒ model (Altman, 2000). We use to develop 
the panel data model, 24 financial statement-based and equity 
valuation items reported by DATASTREAM for UK quoted 
industrial firms.9 Standard financial ratios represent the key 
dimensions of financial analysis, namely, profitability, turnover, 
gearing, and liquidity. As the literature on company failure (see e.g. 
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Cosh and Hughes, 1995) has documented an important role for 
company size which may proxy causal effects of youth and 
inexperience of smaller firms, in this paper we assume that the size 
factor can be introduced into model development by employing the 
net sales variable. Market valuation of the firm is proxied by the 
ratio of market value to book value (premium or discount to net 
tangible assets), while the influence of dividend policy on failure risk 
is represented by the payout ratio (a reciprocal of dividend cover). 
Further, to proxy the firm’s net worth, we also included an index for 
the book value of ordinary shareholders’ funds computed as the sum 
of share capital and reserves less intangibles. This so called “net 
tangible assets index” is defined as a percentage of the assets figure 
obtained from the first (in terms of DATASTREAM records) 
accounts; it is often used for solvency control, and therefore might 
be important in determining the risk of default. To the company, as a 
corporate identity, shareholders’ funds are usually the only source of 
funds, other then liabilities, which it can use to finance assets. 
Changes in ordinary shareholders’ funds also matter because a 
borrower’s financial position is a key determinant of the cost of 
external finance. However, net worth at book values represents a 
rather crude estimate of the firm’s value, because the assets shown in 
the balance sheet are usually recorded at historic cost (less 
depreciation) and may differ greatly from their current market values. 
Finally, the ratio between published tax and published pre-tax profit 
is used to proxy the tax position of the company. The comprehensive 
range allows us to implement in the panel data analysis the general-
to-specific modelling approach 10 and via statistical reduction identify 
the financial performance variables, explaining failure risk for our 
data set. Names and descriptive statistics of independent variables 
employed in modelling are displayed in Table 3. To handle the 
problem of non-stationarity in data, the original DATASTREAM 
values were normalised with respect to means and standard errors of 
relevant cross-sections for each calendar year of the panel, that is 
each observation is relative to the year mean and therefore each 
within year covariate is centred on zero. 
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4. A Fixed Effects Binomial Logit Model for Panel Data  
 
The model with a binary dependent variable can be formulated in 
terms of an underlying latent variable. Typically, for a possibly 
unbalanced panel we would specify: 
 
ititiity åxâ +¢+=a
* ,        (1) 
 
where we observe 1=ity  if 0* >ity , and 0=ity  otherwise. 
 
In (1) we index all variables by an i  for the individual cross-
sectional unit ),...,1( Ni =  and a t  for the time period ),...,1( Tt = . There 
are K  explanatory variables (financial determinants) in itx , which are 
observed, not including a constant. This means that effects of a 
change in x  are the same for all units and all periods, but the average 
level for individual i  may be different from that for unit j .  
 
The ia  captures the effects of those variables that are peculiar to the 
th-i  individual member of the panel and that are constant over time. 
Two basic approaches for modelling heterogeneity are a fixed effects 
treatment and a random effects treatment. The fixed effects approach 
takes ia  to be a group specific constant term and itå  is assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed over individuals and time 
with mean zero and variance 2es : 
 
ititiity åxâ +¢+= a
* ,   ).,0(IID 2es=itå     (2) 
 
A random effects framework specifies that ia  are different but that 
they can be treated as group specific disturbances, similar to itå , 
except for each group there is but a single draw that enters the 
regression identically in each period. The essential assumption is that 
these drawings are independent of the explanatory variables in itx . 
That leads to the random effects model where individual-specific 
constant terms are randomly distributed across cross-sectional units. 
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The error term in this model thus consists of two mutually 
independent components, which are also independent of jsx , namely, 
a time-invariant component ia  and a remainder component ití  that 
are uncorrelated over time. If we specify that itiit í+= aå , the random 
effects model can be written as  
 
ititiit íy +¢++= xâam
* ,   ),0(IID    );,0(IID 22 na ssa == iti í . (3) 
 
The fixed effects approach is contrasted with the random effects one. 
Whether to treat the individual effects ia  as fixed or random can 
make a difference to the estimates of the â  parameters when T  is 
small and N  is large relative to T (Verbeek, 2000). A distinction is 
that under a fixed effects approach we condition on the s'ia , so that 
their distribution plays no role. This interpretation makes sense if the 
individuals in the sample are “one of a kind”, such as large quoted 
companies of the present study, and cannot be viewed as a random 
draw from some underlying population (Greene, 1997). The fixed 
effects model is thus considered as applying only to cross-sectional 
units in the sample and, therefore, inferences are with respect to the 
effects that are in the sample. A random effects approach invokes a 
distribution for ia , and individual-specific constant terms are viewed 
as randomly distributed across cross-sectional units. This is 
appropriate if we believe that sampled cross-sectional units are 
drawn from a large population.11 Thus the random effects approach 
allows one to make inference with respect to the population 
characteristics. However, even if one is interested in the larger 
population of individual units, and a random effects framework 
seems appropriate, the fixed effects estimator may still be preferred. 
The reason for this is that it may be the case that ia  and itx  are 
correlated, in which case the random effects approach, ignoring this 
correlation, leads to inconsistent estimators due to omitted variables. 
 
Two techniques have been commonly used for modelling 
heterogeneity on panel data with a binary dependent variable: a fixed 
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effects logit model based on a conditional likelihood approach due 
to Chamberlain (1980) and a random effects probit model that is 
often referred to as Butler and Moffitt’s (1982) “equicorrelated” 
model. Given that both categories of firms in the panel, the failed 
firms and the non-failed firms, represent a rather large proportion of 
equities, followed by the DATASTREAM database, and were not 
sampled randomly, we would expect the fixed effects approach to 
have some intuitive appeal. More specifically, the 489 non-failed 
firms in the panel represent 36.8 per cent of equities that were on the 
“live” DATASTREAM list as of February 1997, while the 56 failed 
companies account for 50.9 per cent of those quoted companies, that 
according to the London Stock Exchange Official Year Book entered 
the insolvency state over the period 1988-93. The list of firms 
selected for the panel analysis was compiled by excluding 
transportation, petroleum, and financial services companies due to 
their specific taxation and accounting policies, and then through 
unavoidable filtering of companies due to the usual requirement of 
record completeness and continuity for the period of the analysis. 
The above might well have resulted in non-random selection of both 
categories – the failed companies and non-failed companies. Further, 
in the present study we expect that unobserved individual firm-
specific effects, such as, for instance, managerial quality, industry-
specific influences, industrial union power, organisation and 
ownership structure, are likely to be correlated with observable 
characteristics of corporate performance, captured by financial 
statement-based and equity market valuation measures. Therefore it 
would appear reasonable to assume that the fixed effects logit model 
would yield an appropriate specification for the present panel study.  
 
A fixed effects logit model that accounts for heterogeneity is given 
by: 
 
iti
iti
e
e
FailureY xâ
xâ
¢+
¢+
+
== a
a
1
))( 1(Prob .     (4) 
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If we treat ia  in (4) as fixed unknown parameters, we essentially 
including N dummy variables in the model. Maximising the log-
likelihood function with respect to â  and ia  (i=1,...,N) results in a 
consistent estimator provided that the number of time periods T goes 
to infinity. For a short and wide panel, with fixed T and ¥®N , the 
estimators are inconsistent. The reason is that for fixed T, the 
number of parameters grows with the sample size N, which results in 
an “incidental parameters” problem arising in any fixed effects 
model. That is, any ia  can be only estimated consistently if we have 
a growing number of observations for individual i , thus we have T 
tending to infinity. In general, the inconsistency of iaˆ  for fixed T will 
carry over to the estimator for â . 
 
Chamberlain (1980) suggested an approach to estimating a panel 
data model with a binary dependent variable, where N is large and T 
is small. He considers the set of T observations for unit i as a group, 
and then use the likelihood function conditional upon a set of 
statistics it  that are sufficient for ia . This means that conditional 
upon it , an individual’s likelihood contribution no longer depends 
on ia  but still depends upon â .12 In the fixed effects logit model, 
ii yt =  is a sufficient statistic for ia , and consistent estimation is 
possible by conditional maximum likelihood. That is we discard 
alternative sets for which 0=å
T
t
ity  or Ty
T
t
it =å , because these cross-
sectional units never change states and thus contribute zero to the 
likelihood function. The conditional distribution of iTi yy ,...,1  is 
degenerate if 0=it  or 1=it . The conditional likelihood function is 
written as  
 
)|,...,,(Prob
1
2211
1
åÕ
==
====
T
t
itiTiTiiii
N
i
c yyYyYyYL .   (5) 
 
With homogeneity )( aa =i , the model can be estimated as a binomial 
logit model. In order to test the null hypothesis of the homogeneity 
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restriction a Hausman-type test13 based on the difference between 
Chamberlain’s conditional maximum likelihood estimator (CMLE) 
and the usual logit maximum likelihood estimator (ML), ignoring the 
individual effects, is performed.  
 
Constructing the difference MLCMLE
^^
ââq -=ˆ  
with the variance          ),()()ˆ(  MLCMLE VVV
^^
ââq -=  
 
   q)]q[V(q 1 ˆˆˆ -¢=m      (6) 
 
can be used as a 2Kc statistic under the null, where K is the 
dimensionality of â . 
 
Whether the null hypothesis of homogeneity is true or not, 
Chamberlain’s conditional maximum likelihood estimator is 
consistent, but inefficient under the null, because it fails to use the 
homogeneity restriction. The usual maximum likelihood estimator is 
consistent and efficient only under the null of homogeneity and 
inconsistent under the alternative. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
Table 4 presents the results from the logit analysis for three 
parsimonious models derived from a more general specification that 
includes all 24 financial variables.14 Covariates were eliminated using 
a sequence of independent Likelihood Ratio tests. The failure 
outcome is denoted by 1 and the opposite state is assigned 0, 
therefore a positive (negative) coefficient indicates that the factor, 
expressed by the covariate positively (negatively) correlated with the 
outcome of company failure. The diagnostics indicate that the panel 
data models have good overall fit – the Likelihood Ratio test 
statistics are significant at the 0.1 per cent level for all three models. 
In all Models 1, 2, and 3, based on the Hausman 2c  statistics, the 
null hypothesis of homogeneity of intercepts is rejected at the 5% 
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level and better. As discussed above, this implies that control for the 
firm-specific effects is necessary and that, therefore, the results of 
cross-sectional analyses may be biased. Regarding the importance of 
individual dimensions of company performance, the absence of 
gearing measures from all the three models is noteworthy. With 
regard to other dimensions of company performance, profitability, 
turnover, liquidity, and changes in net worth (measured by the index 
of net tangible assets at book value) have a strong effect on the 
probability of failure for the firms in the panel. When the influence 
of ratios, expressing a profitability factor, is examined, at first glance, 
the estimate coefficients in Models 1, 2, and 3 seem not all to have 
the correct sign. For instance, the coefficient for the cumulative 
profitability ratio and the coefficient of the operating profit margin 
(in Models 1 and 2) have contra-intuitive positive signs.  
The essential implication of positively signed coefficients for the 
cumulative profitability ratio, significant at the 10% level, is that 
failing companies are characterised by a greater ratio of revenue 
reserves relative to total assets employed. Aside from that, Models 1 
and 2 link a greater likelihood of failure to higher operating profit 
margins, but this variable is insignificant. Positive coefficients for the 
net profit margin (significant at the 10% level and better in Models 
1, 2, and 3) appear to provide further support to a “teasing” positive 
relationship between profitability and the risk of failure. However, 
coefficients for the pre-tax profit margin (significant at the 10% level 
and better) are negative. 
 
One possible explanation of the signs of these explanatory variables 
stems from the definitions of ratios adopted by DATASTREAM. For 
example, the operating profit margin is calculated before both 
interest expenses and losses on termination of operations. On the 
other hand, the pre-tax profit margin ignores pre-tax and after-tax 
profits of associated companies and undertakings, whereas the net 
(after-tax) profit margin takes account of amounts of associates’ 
profits attributable to the parent company. Therefore, the fact that 
the pre-tax profit margin is negative, but the net profit margin is 
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positive, might have to do with the equity method, used in financial 
reporting of companies, which have subsidiaries, and where financial 
results of subsidiaries are significant in their overall impact. Under 
the equity method, the parent company often shows in consolidated 
accounts proportional profits of its associates attributable to the 
group. Since profits are attributed it is possible that little or nothing 
has been received by the group, and its liquidity position has not 
been improved. In other words, higher profitability as measured by 
the net profit margin might have no bearing on the liquidity of the 
business. For further investigation of the “incorrectly” signed net 
profit margin, more detailed information of cash flow reports and 
relevant notes is needed, however, financial characteristics reflected 
in our data preclude our pursuing this aspect of analysis further. As 
far as the ambiguous sign for the measure of cumulative profitability 
is concerned, it might be explained by the possible impact that 
accounting policies might have on the accounting values of retained 
profits, because attributable revenue reserves of subsidiaries are 
included into revenue reserves of a parent company, in line with the 
equity accounting method. Moreover, the positive sign of the 
operating profit margin, considered together with the negatively 
signed coefficient for the pre-tax profit margin ratio, might be an 
indication that failed companies in the sample were productive and 
economically valuable as they would still be trading and receiving 
revenue from operations in the years preceding insolvency. At the 
same time, they are equally likely to suffer greater losses from 
terminating operations and incurring greater interest expenses as 
compared with the non-failing group. That tentative interpretation of 
the subtle interplay between the four profitability ratios, in our view, 
might reflect certain underlying factors such as shifts in corporate 
sector indebtedness combined with high nominal interest rates 
before the 1990-92 recession, such that the high gearing effect is 
captured by the incidental parameters. Further, “conflicting” signs of 
profit margins and the cumulative profitability ratio are consistent 
with the fixed effects specification, as they would appear to accord 
with the fact that, of the failed category in our panel, many firms are 
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organised as a group or a holding company, and this organisational 
characteristic might also have been captured by the firm-specific 
fixed effects.  
 
All three models suggest an appropriate negative relationship 
between turnover measures and failure risk. The ratio of turnover to 
net current assets is insignificant in Model 1, while the debtors 
turnover ratio is significant at the 10% level in all three models, 
reflecting that before failure there is either a slowdown in trade, due 
to a fall in demand, or a decline in debtors quality resulting in bad 
debts, not recognised by provisions. The liquidity dimension is 
captured by a quick assets ratio, significant at the 5% level and 
better, that deals with the most liquid assets and is regarded as the 
best guide to short-term solvency. In all three models, the quick 
assets ratio suggests the expected negative influence of liquidity on 
the risk of failure. Lastly, all models yield the net tangible assets 
index as a failure determinant that is significant at the 5% level and 
better. As shown in Table 4, a company is more likely to fail if its 
index of net tangible assets is declining. This result is intuitively 
logical as the borrower’s net worth represents a buffer or a crude 
margin of long-term solvency between the assets and the liabilities, 
although, being based on book values and hence historically 
oriented, this measure depends upon accounting conventions. 
Moreover, the strong influence of the assets index should be treated 
with caution as financial reporting policies and practice, which affect 
book values, might have been inconsistent across companies and 
years followed by the panel.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has reported empirical results on financial ratio-based 
determinants of company failure obtained with the panel data on 
large quoted UK industrials for 1988-93. A better understanding of 
the factors determining corporate financial distress and failure, is 
important because at the micro level, it is an ingredient of investment 
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decisions, especially in the context of corporate lending, while at the 
macro level, it is an essential step in designing the inclusive and 
efficient policies preventing and ameliorating crises, by banks and 
regulators. 
 
In the unbalanced panel we follow 539 companies of which 56 firms 
exit the panel due to severe financial distress problems resulted in 
formal insolvency. The structure of the panel constructed resembles 
the actual population proportions of the examined categories of 
failed and non-failed firms. We employ an econometric technique 
that controls for the unobservable permanent differences across 
companies, which are likely to affect the propensity to failure of an 
individual firm. We find evidence of considerable heterogeneity 
across companies in the panel, which suggests that the panel data 
estimates are preferable to the cross-sectional estimates.  
 
As for the individual determinants, our analysis provides the 
following findings. When the fixed individual effects are controlled 
for, our results with regard to important financial dimensions, 
suggest that narrowly defined liquidity, profitability, turnover, and 
changes in net worth (measured as the book value of net tangible 
assets) are the key determinants of failure for firms in our panel data 
set. Moreover, modelling with the panel data captures changes in 
both short-term liquidity and long-term solvency. The documented 
importance of the liquidity dimension emphasises that the current 
cash flow considerations, rather than the economic value of the firm 
based on the future free cash flows, are more pertinent to the 
explanation of company failure in our panel. That result is consistent 
the findings reported in the time-series study of the aggregate rate of 
company insolvency by Turner, Coutts, and Bowden (1992), who 
argue that failure of the banks to extend to distressed companies 
short-term credit on the basis of the long-term potential is an 
important structural weakness of the British economy. The results 
also show that the event of failure is associated with lower pre-tax 
profit margins. However, unexpectedly, the analysis also identifies a 
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concurrent and of roughly equal magnitude, positive link between 
the net profit margin and insolvency risk, which, under the equity 
method used in financial reporting of groups, might be linked to that 
fact that profits of associates are attributable to the parent company. 
This observation appears to be in line with evidence from Geroski 
and Gregg (1996) that holding companies had fared less successfully 
in the 1990-92 recession. In contrast to existing cross-sectional 
studies we do not detect in our panel an association between gearing 
and the probability of insolvency, when models of failure are 
conditioned on the fixed effects. Lastly, inference presented here 
was drawn at the costs of the assumption of the fixed effects and 
must be interpreted with caution since the sample cover just six years 
and the results are applicable only to companies in the study, not to 
the additional firms outside the sample range.  
 
 
Notes
 
1  Fairclough and Hunter (1998) have applied this approach to 
the classification of target firms, but they bootstrap the output 
of the solved net to analyse the performance of a model. 
 
2  It should be noted that although some data are available to 
analyse the subsequent period such analysis requires pooling 
due to a dearth of failed companies across the period 1994-
2000. 
 
3  Exports continued to grow during the 1990-92 recession (see 
the article “The UK Recession 1990-92” in Economic 
Briefing, 6, 1994) and export-oriented firms fared better 
during the economy downturn (Geroski and Gregg, 1996). 
 
4  Using data generated from a large-scale survey of how UK 
firms coped with the 1991 recession, Geroski and Gregg 
(1996), identify an association in the data between organisation 
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and ownership structure and vulnerability to the recession. 
Holding companies and firms with highly dispersed share 
ownership tended to be a little more vulnerable to recessionary 
pressures than functionally organised and divisionalised firms 
with a dominant owner (such as foreign owned firms). 
 
5  See Dickerson, Gibson, and Tsakalotos (1997). 
 
6  Machin and Van Reenen (1993) employ an explicit measure of 
industrial unionism in their panel study of UK firms’ 
profitability.  
 
7  Young (1995) discusses how the types of debt contract might 
have influenced aggregate company liquidations in the UK in 
the early 1990s, because a variable-rate debt is a good hedge 
against inflationary shocks whereas fixed-rate debt is a good 
hedge against real interest rate shocks. His empirical findings 
from the time-series study support two reasons for the rise in 
compulsory and creditors’ voluntary liquidations over the early 
1990s. The first reason has been an unexpected rise in real 
interest rates in the late 1980s, and the more important second 
factor has been that, over the period from the mid-1970s to 
early 1990s, variable-rate debt was heavily used.  
 
8  The DATASTREAM code for this equity list was “UKQI”. For 
reasons of space, the list of the sample companies, is not 
reported here and can be found in Isachenkova (2001).   
 
9  For a more detailed description of the firm-specific explanatory 
variables used in this study, see Isachenkova (2001).  
 
10  A general-to-specific approach to modelling has been applied 
to economic time-series by Davidson, Hendry, Srba and Yeo et 
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al (1978) and in the context of a cross-sectional analysis of 
company accounts by Hunter and Komis (2000). 
 
11  Appropriate scaling will help to alleviate such problem, as the 
differences associated with size, for example, are less pervasive 
when the data are standardised. However, the micro units in 
the sample may differ for other reasons, such as for example: 
industry sector or export sensitivity. 
 
12  In the panel data model with a binary dependent variable, the 
existence of a minimal sufficient statistic depends upon the 
functional form of )(×F , that is, depends on distribution of ite . If 
a sufficient statistic it exists, this means that there exists a 
statistic it such that the probability mass function does not 
depend on ia , that is ),|,...,(),,|,...,( 11 ââ iiTiiiiTi tyyftyyf =a . For a probit 
model no sufficient statistic for ia  exists. Thus in applying the 
fixed effects models to discrete dependent variables based on 
panel data, the logit model and the log-linear model seem to be 
the only choices (Maddala, 1987).  
 
13  Hausman (1978). 
 
14  For a full discussion of the findings see Isachenkova (2001). 
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 TABLE 1:  Transition within the Panel of UK Industrial Companies for 1988-93 
   (Failure is determined as the time of release of the last accounts)  
 
  
 Unbalanced Panel: 1988-93 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
       
Total 539 539 521 505 493 488 
Companies “live” in the current year and subsequent years of 
the panel 
483 483 483 483 483 483 
Companies failing over the current and subsequent years of 
the panel 
56 56 38 22 10 5 
Cumulative total of companies failed in preceding years and 
in the current year 
- 18 34 46 51 56 
Companies failing in the current year t - 18 16 12 5 5 
Companies failing in the current year t, per cent - 3.34 3.07 2.38 1.01 1.02 
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TABLE 2:  Sectoral Composition of the UK Industrial Company Panel for 1988-93,  
 Breakdown of Observational Units by Economic Group (Percentages in parentheses) 
 
  
 FT-SE  Economic Groups 
 
 
Mineral 
Extraction 
General 
Industrials 
Consumer 
Goods 
 
Services 
 
Utilities 
 
Total 
Unbalanced Panel: Distribution across 1988-93 (N=539) 
             
1988  Non-Failed 1 (0.19) 307 (56.96) 80 (14.84) 150 (27.83) 1 (0.19) 539 (100) 
1988  Failed - - - - - - - - -  0 (100) 
1989  Non-Failed 1 (0.19) 299 (57.39) 78 (14.97) 142 (27.26) 1 (0.19) 521 (100) 
1989  Failed - - 8 (44.44) 2 (11.11) 8 (44.44) - - 18 (100) 
1990  Non-Failed 1 (0.20) 289 (57.23) 77 (15.25) 137 (27.13) 1 (0.20) 505 (100) 
1990  Failed - - 10 (62.50) 1 (6.25) 5 (31.25) - - 16 (100) 
1991  Non-Failed 1 (0.20) 285 (57.81) 77 (15.62) 129 (26.17) 1 (0.20) 493 (100) 
1991  Failed - - 4 (33.33) - - 8 (66.67) - - 12 (100) 
1992  Non-Failed 1 (0.20) 282 (57.79) 77 (15.78) 127 (26.02) 1 (0.20) 488 (100) 
1992  Failed - - 3 (60.00) - - 2 (40.00) - - 5 (100) 
1993  Non-Failed 1 (0.21) 279 (57.76) 76 (15.73) 126 (26.09) 1 (0.21) 483 (100) 
1993  Failed - - 3 (60.00) 1 (20.00) 1 (20.00) - - 5 (100) 
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TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics for UK Quoted Companies in the 1988-93 Panel, 483 Non-failed Companies and 56 
Failed Companies with a Maximum of 6 Years of Data on Each Company, Sample Size 3,085 [(488´6)+ 
(5´5)+ (12´4)+ (16´3)+(18´2)] 
 
continued on next page 
 
 
Mean St. Dev. Annual Means 
 
Original Values, Levels Original Values, Levels 
 
Full Sample: 3,085 obs.  539 firms 539 firms 521 firms 505 firms 493 firms 488 firms 
 
1988 -93 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Financial Dimension        
Accounting Variable          
Size         
Total Sales (net of trade discounts (£,m))  546.116 1405.888  424.586 501.920 549.124 565.561 601.056 651.352 
Profitability         
Return on Shareholders’ Capital (percentage)   10.510  101.743 17.024  16.563  8.034  14.951  9.791  -4.566  
Return on Capital Employed (percentage) 15.502  48.046  21.096  21.093  12.131  12.019  12.849  13.072  
Return on Net Fixed Assets (percentage)  19 .080 99.506  39.119  32.561  20.558  7.612  3.020  8.637  
Cumulative Profitability   0.341  2.701  0.401  0.336  0.349  0.226  0.420   
Operating Profit Margin (percentage)  6.746  23.250  9.048  8.751  7.490  6.020  5.630  3.092  
Pre-tax Profit Margin  (percentage)  5.912  20 .287 8.835  7.982  6.385  4.537  4.671  2.585  
Net Profit Margin (percentage)  3.537  19.463  5.886  5.034  3.778  2.540  2.925  0.692  
Turnover         
Turnover / Fixed Assets  6.409  11.062  6.496  6.179  6.020  5.930  2.741  7.197  
Turnover / Net Current Assets  9.908  153.093  25.651  4.062  4.440  12.118  5.960  6.525  
Stock Turnover 17.621  105.138 25.802  12.906  12.477  20.242  17.710  16.511  
Debtors Turnover  7.431  12.803  7.590  6.983  7.491  7.305  7.392  7.871  
Creditors Turnover  5.221  2.424  5.190  5.061  5.194  5.316  5.255  5.337  
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Table 3: - Continued  
 
 
Mean St. Dev. Annual Means 
 
Original Values, Levels Original Values, Levels 
 
Full Sample: 3,085 obs. 539 firms 539 firms 521 firms 505 firms 493 firms 488 firms 
 
1988 -93  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Financial Dimension         
Accounting Variable          
Gearing         
Capital Gearing (percentage)  33.221  99.393  25.174  36.902  31.771  37.460  31.269  37.252  
Income Gearing (percentage)  9.239 922.089 16.703  18.192  57.520  -50.897  39.138  -28.376  
Borrowing Ratio  0.614 5.110  0.504  0.937  0.702  0.356  0.547  0.624  
Gross Cash-flow / Total Liabilities  0.098 0.684  0.171  0.101  0.090  0.070  0.093  0.054  
Loan Capital / Equity and Reserves  0.336 4.052  0.224  0.596  0.346  0.216  0.324  0.297  
Liquidity         
Working Capital Ratio  1.573 0.993  1.651  1.528  -0.080  1.548  1.621  1.585  
Quick Assets Ratio 0.987 0.857  1.026  0.937  0.935  0.970  1.036  1.022  
Other         
Market Value/Book Value 2.171 6.163  2.646  2.279  1.651  1.623  2.163  2.660  
Payout Ratio  0.490 3.198  2.750  0.584  0.559  0.623  0.652 0.157  
Assets Index (percentage)  1991.846  15673.119 1924.887  2018.541  1898.274  1997.071  2047.921  2078.299  
Tax Ratio (percentage)  26.305  173.176 29.896  29.409  9.461  28.041  24.251  37.233  
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TABLE 4: Results from Fixed Effects Binary Logit for the Unbalanced 
Panel of UK Quoted Companies, the Panel Period 1988-93 
 
 
Alternative Specifications of Fixed Effects Binary Logit 
For the Unbalanced Panel of UK Quoted Companies, for 1988-93, 
Failure Times are Defined as Years the Last Accounts Released, 
N=539, T=6, Sample Size 3,085 [(488´6)+(5´5)+(12´4)+(16´3)+(18´2)], 
56 Failed Companies 
 
 
Financial Dimension 
Accounting Variable 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 Coefficient (two-tailed p-value of asymptotic t-statistic) 
Profitability       
Cumulative Profitability 0.314 (0.060) 0.302 (0.075) - - 
Operating Profit Margin 0.755 (0.155) 0.765 (0.147) - - 
Pre-tax Profit Margin -3.484 (0.028) -3.754 (0.018) -2.766 (0.070) 
Net Profit Margin 2.858 (0.036) 3.107 (0.023) 2.666 (0.061) 
Turnover       
Turnover /Net Current Assets  -0.747 (0.166) - - - - 
Debtors Turnover -3.914 (0.059) -3.697 (0.067) -2.902 (0.087) 
Liquidity       
Quick Assets Ratio -3.603 (0.011) -3.568 (0.009) -2.622 (0.016) 
Net Worth       
Assets Index -92.028 (0.002) -99.200 (0.001) -100.789 (0.001) 
Log Likelihood 
at Convergence 
 
-30.84 
 
-32.28 
 
-34.25 
 
c2 statistic of LR Test1 
(p-value) 
65.71 
(0.000) 
62.83 
(0.000) 
58.91 
(0.000) 
 
Hausman Fixed effects Test  
c2 statistic 
 
53.58 
 
33.37 
 
13.01 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) 
n 3,085 
Per cent Failed  1.8   
    
 
 
1 Note that here the Likelihood Ratios are only a function of the slope 
parameters and not the fixed effects themselves, which are never estimated. 
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